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SUPREME COURT WATCH: RECENT DECISIONS AND UPCOMING CRIMINAL
CASES FOR THE 2008-2009 DOCKET
Emily Pasternak*
Watson v. United States
128 S.Ct. 579
Decided December 10, 2007
Question Presented:
Where a defendant receives a gun in exchange for
drugs, has he “used” the gun “during and in relation to . . .
[a] drug trafficking crime within the meaning of the federal
drug law 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)?

simply by receiving it in a barter transaction, but no one else
would.” The Court cited previous decisions to support its
interpretation of the term “uses.” In United States v. Stewart,
the Court held that “[w]hen a person pays a cashier a dollar
for a cup of coffee in the courthouse cafeteria, the customer
has not used the coffee. He has only used the dollar bill.”
246 F.3d 728, 731 (C.A.D.C. 2001). Therefore, when
Watson handed over the drugs for the pistol, the informant
“used” the pistol, but “regular speech would not say that
Watson himself used the pistol in the trade.”
Justice Ginsburg concurred in judgment.

Facts:
18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A) sets a mandatory
minimum sentence for a defendant who, “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . .
uses or carries a firearm.” The statute does not define the
term “uses,” and the breadth of the term is what gives rise to
this case.
Michael Watson told a government informant that
he wanted to buy a gun. The informant suggested that
Watson pay in narcotics. Watson exchanged twenty-four
doses of OxyContin for a .50 caliber semiautomatic pistol
and was arrested. A federal grand jury indicted him for distributing a controlled substance and for “using” the pistol
during and in relation to that crime, in violation of Section
924(c)(1)(A). Watson pled guilty to both charges but
reserved the right to challenge the factual basis for a Section
924(c)(1)(A) conviction.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, following Circuit
precedent, affirmed the decision of the District Court that
Watson had “used” the firearm. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts.
Decision:
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in this
unanimous judgment, holding that a person does not “use” a
firearm under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A) when he
receives it in trade for drugs. The Supreme Court has
addressed the meaning of the term “uses” twice before, in
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) and in Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
In Smith, the issue raised was the converse of the
issue raised in this case. The Court held that “a criminal who
trades his firearm for drugs ‘uses’ it during and in relation to
a drug trafficking offense within the meaning of Section
924(c)(a).”
In Bailey, the issue was whether possessing a
firearm near the scene of drug crime is “used” under Section
924(c)(1). The Court held that the mere possession of a gun
does not amount to “using” the gun under the statute. In
both decisions the Court used the ordinary and natural meaning of the verb “to use.”
In making its decision, the Watson Court stated that,
“[t]he Government may say that a person ‘uses’ a firearm
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Kimbrough v. United States
128 S.Ct. 558
Decided December 10, 2007
Questions Presented:
(1)
When imposing a sentence for distributing crack
cocaine, may a District Court judge consider the impact of
the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio and the Sentencing
Commission’s view that the ratio leads to exaggerated sentences for crimes involving crack cocaine?
(2)
May a District Court judge, in an effort to avoid a
sentencing disparity, impose a sentence that is below the
range recommended by the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio in
the Guidelines?
Facts:
In September 2004, petitioner Derrick Kimbrough
was indicted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia and charged with four offenses:
(1) conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine; (2)
possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of
crack cocaine; (3) possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine; and (4) possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug-trafficking offense. Kimbrough pled guilty to all four
charges.
Even though crack cocaine and powder cocaine are
chemically similar, they are treated very differently for sentencing purposes. Based on assumptions that crack cocaine
was more dangerous than powder, the Sentencing
Commission, following the Congressional Act of 1986,
adopted a 100-to-1 ratio that treated every gram of crack
cocaine as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine.
“The 100-to-1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses three
to six times longer than those for powder offenses involving
equal amounts of drugs.” The Commission has since sought,
unsuccessfully, to eliminate the disparity in the Guidelines
between crack and powder cocaine.
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the
Court held that the mandatory sentencing guidelines system
violated the Sixth Amendment. Booker rendered the guide-
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lines “effectively advisory.” The statute, 18 U.S.C. Section
3553, “as modified by Booker, contains an overarching provision instructing district courts to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to accomplish the goals
of sentencing” and lists several factors for a court to consider.
According to the Guidelines, Kimbrough should
have been subjected to an aggregate sentence of fifteen
years to life in prison. However, the District Court believed
that this sentence would have been greater than necessary
and “commented that the case exemplified the ‘disproportionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have
in sentencing.’”
The District Court chose to sentence Kimbrough
as if he had been charged, not with possession of crack
cocaine, but with an equivalent amount of powder cocaine.
As a result, the guideline range fell from “228 to 270
months” to the lesser range of “97 to 106 months.”
Deciding that the statutory minimum sentence was
“clearly long enough” to accomplish the objectives listed in
the statute, Section 3553(a), the court sentenced Kimbrough
to fifteen years, or 180 months, in prison plus five years of
supervised release. The prison sentence consisted of 120
months for each of the three drug counts, to run concurrently, plus 60 months for the firearm count to run consecutively.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
sentence according to precedent that a sentence “outside the
guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on
a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and
powder cocaine offenses.” United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d
625 (C.A.4 2006).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
“whether the crack/powder disparity adopted in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines has been rendered ‘advisory’
by [their] decision in Booker,” a question that has divided
the Courts of Appeals.
Decision:
Justice Ginsburg delivered the Court’s 7-2 decision
holding that the sentence imposed on Kimbrough should
survive appellate review because although the District Court
assigned him a sentence outside of the guidelines, it was not
an abuse of discretion because the sentence was reasonable
and would achieve the purpose of Section 3553(a).
The Government argued that the Guidelines adopting the 100-to-1 ratio are an exception to the “general freedom that sentencing courts have to apply the Section
3553(a) factors” because the ratio is a “specific policy determination that Congress has directed sentencing courts to
observe.”
The Court rejected the Government’s argument,
holding that while the Commission’s recommendation of a
sentence range reflects a rough approximation of sentences
that might achieve Section 3553(a)’s objectives, the sentencing judge is familiar with the individual case and defendant
and therefore, the judge is “in a superior position to find
facts and judge their import under Section 3553(a).”
The Court further noted that the Commission itself
has reported that the disparity between crack and powder
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sentences results in “disproportionately harsher sanctions.”
Therefore, the Court held that it is not an abuse of discretion
for a district court to decide that the crack/powder disparity
results in a sentence “greater than necessary” to achieve
Section 3553(a)’s purpose for an individual defendant.
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed dissenting
opinions.

Logan v. United States
128 S.Ct. 475
Decided December 4, 2007
Question Presented:
Does the “civil rights restored” exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. Section 921(a)(20) encompass, and
therefore remove from the Armed Career Criminal Act’s
reach, state-court convictions that at no time deprived the
offender of civil rights?
Facts:
James Logan pled guilty in a United States District
Court to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). Because of Logan’s
record, which included three Wisconsin court convictions of
misdemeanor battery, the District Court imposed a fifteen
year to life sentence of imprisonment.
The minimum of fifteen years was mandated by the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. Section
924(e)(1), which offers guidelines to enhance sentences.
However, the ACCA states that a prior conviction may be
disregarded if the offender has had civil rights restored. The
convictions that triggered Logan’s ACCA-enhanced sentence caused no loss of civil rights.
In District Court and the Court of Appeals, Logan
argued that his Wisconsin misdemeanor convictions did not
qualify as enhanceable offenses under the ACCA because
they did not cause him to lose his civil rights. Logan reasoned that retained rights are equivalent to rights lost but
later restored, and therefore the exception clause in Section
921(a)(20) covered his three state-court misdemeanor convictions. This would result in the reduction of Logan’s minimum sentence of fifteen years under the ACCA to a maximum sentence of ten years.
The District Court rejected Logan’s argument and
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding that “an
offender whose civil rights have been neither diminished nor
returned is not a person who ‘has had civil rights restored.’”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
split among the Circuits as to whether Section 921(a)(20)’s
exception for “civil rights restored” should be interpreted to
include civil rights never lost.
Decision:
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the unanimous court holding that the Section 921(a)(20) exemption
provision does not cover the case of an offender who
retained civil rights at all times. The Court rejected Logan’s
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argument that retention of rights must be treated as the legal
equivalent to restoration of rights to prevent less serious
offenders from receiving ACCA enhanced penalties while
more serious offenders who have had civil rights restored
may escape heightened punishment.
First, the Court examined the plain meaning of the
word “restore” and found that it means “to give back something that had been taken away.” The Court noted that
“[w]ords in a list are generally known by the company they
keep.” The words accompanying “restore” in Section
921(a)(20) are “expunged,” “set aside,” and “pardoned.”
Each term describes a way for the government to relieve the
offender from some or all of the consequences of his conviction. “In contrast, a defendant who retains rights is simply
left alone.”
Next the Court discussed the effect Logan’s interpretation of the statute would have. The Court explained
that some states do not revoke any offender’s civil rights,
and that under Logan’s interpretation of the statute, the most
dangerous recidivists could fall under the Section 921(a)(20)
exception.
Finally, the Court noted that the statutory language
rejects Logan’s argument. Section 921(a)(20) reads “[a] person shall not be considered to have been convicted if the
conviction . . . is an offense for which the person has been
pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the
applicable jurisdiction provides or the loss of civil rights
under such an offense).” The Court emphasized that the parenthetical qualification shows that the phrase “civil rights
restored” does not refer to a person whose civil rights were
never revoked.

Gall v. United States
128 S. Ct. 586
Decided December 10, 2007
Question Presented:
May the Court of Appeals apply a “proportionality
test” and require that a sentence that constitutes a substantial
variance from the Sentencing Guidelines be justified by
extraordinary circumstances?
Facts:
In early 2000, Brian Gall, while a student at the
University of Iowa, became a member of an ecstacy distribution conspiracy. For seven months, he delivered ecstasy pills
to co-conspirators, netting over $30,000. Gall voluntarily
left the conspiracy in September 2000. He did not sell any
drugs after that time, and, after graduating in 2002, he
entered the construction industry, where he has worked ever
since. On April 28, 2004, Gall was indicted for participating in a conspiracy to distribute ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana.
The District Court, considering Gall’s post-offense
conduct, including his obtaining a college degree, the start of
his own business, the support of his family and friends, lack
of criminal history, and his age, sentenced Gall to probation
for a term of thirty-six months.
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded for resentencing. It held that a sentence outside of the range of the Sentencing Guidelines must
be supported by a justification that “is proportional to the
extent of the difference between the advisory range and the
sentence imposed” and that such a variance must be supported by extraordinary circumstances. It held that neither of
these requirements were met in the case at hand. First, it
held that the difference between a sentence of probation and
the minimum sentence suggested by the sentencing guidelines (thirty months imprisonment) was 100%. Next, it held
that the District Judge made five errors in reasoning: (1) he
gave “too much weight to Gall’s withdrawal from the conspiracy;” (2) he gave too much weight to studies showing
impetuous behavior by those under the age of eighteen; (3)
he did not “properly weigh” the seriousness of Gall’s
offense; (4) he failed to consider “unwarranted” disparities
caused by the sentence; and (5) he placed “too much emphasis on Gall’s post-offense rehabilitation.”
Decision:
Justice Stevens delivered the 7-2 opinion of the
Court. The Court held that because the Sentencing
Guidelines are now advisory in nature, “appellate review of
sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they
are reasonable” under the abuse of discretion standard of
review. The Court specifically rejected rules that require
extraordinary circumstances to justify sentences outside of
Guidelines range and rejected the use of mathematical formulas that use percentage of departure from the Guidelines
as the standard for determining the strength of justification
that must be made by the district court. It held that these
approaches “come too close to creating an impermissible
presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the
Guidelines range.”
The court held that the proper method of appellate
review is for the appellate court to first make sure that the
district court did not commit a procedural error (such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating the Sentencing
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence), and to then consider
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an
abuse of discretion standard, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances. The court concluded that the District
Judge did not commit a significant procedural error, nor was
the sentence he imposed on Gall unreasonable under the
abuse of discretion standard. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion.
Justices Thomas and Alito filed dissenting opinions.

Allen v. Siebert
128 S.Ct. 2
Decided November 5, 2007
Question Presented:
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, is the statute of limitations for a federal habeas
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petition tolled when an untimely application for state postconviction relief is filed?
Facts:
Daniel Siebert was convicted and sentenced to death
in Alabama for murder. Siebert’s conviction and sentence
were affirmed on direct appeal. On August 25, 1992, Siebert
filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Alabama State
Court, and his petition was denied as untimely because it
was filed after the statute of limitations had run. On
September 14, 2001, Siebert filed a petition for a federal writ
of habeas corpus in an Alabama District Court.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA) established a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition. However, the
statute of limitations is paused, or tolled, while “a properly
filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending.”
Decision:
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held
that for an application for post-conviction relief to be “properly filed,” it must be timely, and therefore, an untimely
application does not toll the statute of limitations for the
AEDPA. This holding relied on the Supreme Court decision
in Pace v. DiGuielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), holding that a
state post-conviction petition rejected as untimely is not
properly filed within the meaning of the AEDPA.
Although the District Court followed Pace and
rejected Siebert’s habeas petition, the Court of Appeals
reversed, distinguishing Pace on the grounds that Rule
32.2(c) (the Alabama rule that rendered Siebert’s application
for post-conviction relief untimely), unlike the statute of
limitations in Pace, “operates as an affirmative defense.”
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and stated,
“[w]hen a post-conviction petition is untimely under state
law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of [the
AEDPA].”

“unreasonable” because it was “greater than necessary to
comply with the purposes of sentencing” under Section
3553(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit held that “a sentence
imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines range . . .
is presumptively reasonable.” The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits.
Decision:
Justice Breyer delivered the 8-1 majority decision
of the Court affirming the Circuit Court’s holding that a sentenced based on the Guidelines is presumptively reasonable
during appellate review.
The Court first pointed out that a presumption is not
binding and does not lead to strong judicial deference.
Instead, “the presumption reflects the fact that, by the time
an appeals court is considering a with-in-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the
Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case.”
Therefore, when a judge sentences a defendant within the
guidelines, he is consistent with the Commission’s judgment
in general.
Rita argued that, because the Guidelines change in
the presence of special facts, such as brandishing a weapon,
and because the judge would be determining these facts in
many instances, the Guidelines violate the Sixth
Amendment. The Court rejected Rita’s argument, holding
that the Sixth Amendment does “not automatically forbid a
sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence.”
Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas
joined. Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED IN UPCOMING
CASES GRANTED CERTIORARI

Begay v. United States
Rita v. United States
127 S.Ct. 2456
Decided June 21, 2007
Question Presented:
May a Court of Appeals apply a presumption of reasonableness to a District Court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines according to 18
U.S.C. Section 3553(a)(2)?
Facts:
Victor Rita committed perjury while testifying in
front of a grand jury. The District Court concluded that the
sentencing guideline range of thirty-three to forty-one
months in prison under Section 3553(a)(2) was appropriate
and sentenced him to thirty-three months in prison.
Rita appealed and argued that the sentence was
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Docket: 06-11543
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question presented:
Is a felony driving offense a “violent felony” for the
purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Irizarry v. United States
Docket: 06-7517
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
Must a judge give both the prosecution and the defense
advance notice before imposing a criminal sentence that departs
from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?
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Snyder v. Louisiana
Docket: 06-10119
Louisiana Supreme Court
Questions Presented:
Did a prosecutor's reference to the O.J. Simpson
murder trial prejudice an all-white jury against a black
defendant who was eventually sentenced to death? Did the
lower court ignore the import of Miller-El by failing to consider probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including
the prosecutor's repeat references to the Simpson trial, the
prosecutor's use of challenges to purge all African
Americans from the jury, the disparate questioning of white
and black prospective jurors, and the documented pattern of
the prosecutor's office diluting minority presence in petit
juries? Did the lower court err in holding that failure to raise
a Batson objection can never result in prejudice under
Strickland v. Washington?

Baze v. Rees
Docket: 07-6439
Supreme Court of Kentucky
Question Presented:
Do lethal injections in capital cases create an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eight
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?

Greenlaw v. United States
Docket: 07-330
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
May an appellate court, without a motion from the
prosecution, increase a sentence when the district court misinterpreted the case law and sentenced the defendant to a
term less than the mandatory minimum?
United States v. Santos, Efrain, and Diaz
Docket: 06-1005
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Question presented:
Under 19 U.S.C. Section 1956(a)(1), the federal
money laundering statute, which makes it a crime to engage
in a financial transaction using the proceeds from certain
illegal activities with the intent of promoting these activities
or concealing the proceeds, are proceeds the gross receipts
from the illegal activities or only the profits?
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Kennedy v. Louisiana
Docket: 07-343
Louisiana Supreme Court
Questions Presented:
Does the Louisiana statute allowing the death penalty for the rape of a child under the age of twelve violate the
Eight Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment?

District of Columbia v. Heller
Docket: 07-290
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
Do three District of Columbia firearms ordinances:
D.C. Code Section 7-2502.02(a)(4), barring the registration
of handguns; D.C. Code Section 22-4504(a), prohibiting carrying a pistol without a license; and D.C. Code section 72507.02, requiring that all lawfully owned firearms be kept
unloaded and either disassembled or trigger locked, violate
the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not
affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to
keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their
homes?

Arave v. Hoffman
Docket: 07-110
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
When a defendant who rejects a plea bargain
because his attorney assured him he would not receive the
death penalty is sentenced to death, has his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington?
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